[Previous ending to my essay On Interest
Cf. http://inamidst.com/whits/2008/Nov17.1307
& associated conversations.]

Incidentally, I think that this might play into
the kind of notion that Joe Geldart has of Natural
Philosophy; I should talk to him about this. The
point would be something like: Nat. Phil. is
generally understood in terms of the root of
modern sciences, but if you were a Natural
Philosopher in the 17th century, how would you
understand your own craft then? It would be quite
different to how we understand it now.

In other words, Natural Philosophy turned out in
this certain direction, and we now define Natural
Philosophy partly in terms of its effects. But
these effects aren't inherent to the original
Natural Philosophy. So our definition is deficient
in that respect. Talking about the cracks between
disciplines is perhaps a better characterisation
of Natural Philosophy, but perhaps not. It's hard
to explain how orthogonal this is to thinking
about academic disciplines at the moment. A
suitable metaphor feels hard to find, here.